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【期刊名称】 《北大国际法与比较法评论》
A Historical Perspective on China’s Approaches to International Criminal Law:Past,Present and Future
【作者】 Anlei ZUO【作者单位】 University of Hong Kong{Faculty of Law}
【分类】 国际刑法学
【中文关键词】 International Criminal Law;China’s Approaches;Historical Perspective;Eurocentrism;Rise of China
【期刊年份】 2018年【期号】 1(第15卷)
【总期号】 总第18期【页码】 63
【摘要】

China's approachto international criminal law is arepresentative example of non-Western people's perspectives towards theWestern-dominated internationallaw.Thispaperprovidesahistoricalperspective for analyzing China's approaches to international criminal law inthe aspects of historicalorigins, contemporarydynamicsand furtherimplications. China hasbeeninteracting with theWestern-dominatedinternational law in a reluctant, instrumental and pragmatic way since theOpium War, as well as historically critical and culturally conservative; the finalgoal of China's interaction with the Western-dominated international law hasalways been to achieve national rejuvenation. Specific to China andinternational criminal law, China's general approach of critical thinking,constructive engagement and realistic utilitarianism manifests its critical andpragmatic attitudes towards the Western-dominated international law, whichhave their historical origins in China's “century of humiliation”. Contemporarydynamics of China's approaches illustrate the“clash of ignorance”andstructural biases of Eurocentrism in the Western-dominated internationalcriminal law. Under the context of the rise of China, China's approachesprovide valuable implications on the future evolution of the current Western-dominated international law.

【全文】法宝引证码CLI.A.1265341    
  1 Introduction: China and International Criminal Law
  China's approach to international law is a pivotal and crucial issue incontemporary international legal studies. As a great power throughout its longhistory, China has been a resistor, taker and maker of the existing Western-dominated international law since the nineteenth century.[1]It is thusanalytically representative and methodologically effective to take China'sengagement and interaction with the current international legal system as anexample of the relationship between “the rest” and the Western-dominatedinternational law, and it is also a unique and significant case study of a potentialsuperpower and reformer of the Western-dominated international law given the riseof China in the new millennium.[2]Furthermore, “China and international law”provides an opportunity to historically and critically reexamine the evolution ofthe Western-dominated international law and the nature of current globalgovernance paradigms by exposing the structural biases and systematic violenceof Eurocentrism thereof for a more democratic and equitable world order.
  Specifically, international criminal law, as one of the key components ofthe so-called “international rule of law” and transnational justice, is a verysensitive and controversial subfield of international law to China. Existingresearch works on“China and international criminal law”are helpful tounderstand China's current positions and specific concerns towards someinternational legal rules and regimes, as well as the inner contradictions andinherent tensions thereof.[3]However, they are far from adequate in that theiranalyses are detached and isolated from the historical origins of China'sapproaches to international law and the bigger picture of the global history ofinternational law(including its noble goals and dark sides).[4]That is,Eurocentrism in the studies on “China and international criminal law” is stillprevalent, and the historical origins and civilizational idiosyncrasies of China'sapproaches to international criminal law have not been fully elaborated to date.
  Therefore, this research focuses on China's approaches to internationalcriminal law—a representative example of China's perception and reception ofinternational law—to explore the historical origins, contemporary dynamics andfuture developments of China's attitudes and practices, thus illustrating theglobal history and evolution of international law in light of China's engagementand interaction. The research question is how China has understood andinteracted with the Western-dominated international criminal law. This paperdoes not focus on specific historical or normative analyses of China's practices,but provide a historical framework and perspective for “China and internationalcriminal law” so as to analyze China's approaches to international criminal lawin particular and critically understand the nature of the Western-dominatedinternational law in general.
  The structure of this paper is as follows. After the introduction, Section 2examines China's approaches to international law since the Opium War to set thehistorical context of the China-West confrontation in international law. Section 3elaborates on the historical origins, contemporary dynamics and future evolutionof China's approaches to international criminal law, particularly China'sparticipation in international criminal tribunals and ad hoc courts, China and theinternational criminal court, as well as the past, present and future of China'sapproaches to international criminal law. The last section concludes the paper.
  2 China's Approaches to International Law since theOpium War
  China is a representative case on the“historical meaning of international lawto non-Western peoples”.[5]There are already some thought-provoking works onChina and international law with respect to China's engagement and interaction,application and observation, potential challenges and contributions to theWestern-dominated international legal system since the late Qing.[6]Also, thereare many other illuminating writings on China's reception and perception ofinternational law, China's active involvement with the international normative system in the post-Mao era, China's pragmatic and flexible approach to international law inthe Spratly Islands dispute, international law and the rise of China, China's reformand opening-up policy and international law, the application of international law inChinese domestic courts, China's practices of international law, etc.[7]Moreover,Martti Koskenniemi, Lauri Malskoo and other legal academics have providedinsightful analyses and arguments on comparative international law.[8]Besides,historical and critical studies of international law,[9]together with other studies from interdisciplinary perspectives, are also enlightening in obtaining a betterunderstanding of the nature and evolution of the Western -dominated internationallaw, as well as China's approaches to international law. [10]
  However, existing academic writings on China and international law are farfrom overcoming the Eurocentrism in the international legal studies, or in thecall of Dipesh Chakrabarty, the provincialization of Europe.[11]Many writings arestill stagnated in Eurocentrism and unable to unravel the relationship between thecurrent Western-dominated international legal system and China; that is, studies on“what is international law and what is international law for” from the perspectives of“the rest” and “the other” have been inadequate. Significantly related themes remainto be fully explored, such as the inclusiveness of international law as a language orculture of global governance, and civilizational influences on the approaches to theWestern-dominated international law.[12] Namely, the goal of taking “China and international law” as a case study on the global history and evolution of theWestern-dominated international law has yet to be realized.
  Therefore, the following section provides a historical framework for China'sapproaches to the Western-dominated international law to address these issues.
  2. 1 China's Approaches to International Law during the Late Qingin 1839-1912
  Since the First Opium War(1839-1842),[13] China has been forced tointeract with Western “civilized” powers(including Japan) in accordance withthe Western-dominated international law, while the traditional Chinese worldorder and corresponding system of   international rules have becomesubordinate. [14]Specifically, economic interests in the Sino-British trade andthe conflicts of diplomatic protocols(which stem from different worldviewsand systems of international law) are the two primary underlying reasons forthe Opium War, [15] and the forced signing of the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 isthe commencement of substantive interaction between China and the Western-dominated international law in China's modern historical process of itsendeavors to save the nation and people. [16] The Opium War marked the startof the so-called “century of humiliation”(bainian guochi) for China from 1839to 1949, as well as the start of modern Chinese history. More than five hundred“unequal treaties” have been concluded in modern Chinese history, [17] whichintensively encroached on the sovereignty rights of China and public welfare of the Chinese people, especially the ceding or leasing of territories, forcedopening of ports for trade, imposition of extraterritoriality on foreigners livingin China, large amounts of reparations and loss of tariff autonomy. [18] China'sprevious isolation and its reluctance to have contacts with the West, traditionalrules of foreign relations and regional governance system were constantlydefeated and torn apart, [19] while Western international law was used to justifycolonialism, imperialism and hegemonism during the Opium War in the lateQing, as well as in the eras of the Republic of China(“ROC”) and People'sRepublic of China(“PRC”).[20]
  Chinese open-minded intellectuals and government officials in the lateQing who “opened their eyes to see the world”(kaiyan kan shijie) realized thatthe traditional Chinese world order would not be able to cope with the invasionof the West by modern military force and economic colonization, as it hadtechnologically lagged behind due to the First Industrial Revolution(1760s-1840s) in Europe and China's great wall of self-isolation resultant ofSinocentrism, worldview of“Celestial Empire”(tianchao shangguo)and“Seclusion Policy”(biguan suoguo) in the Qing dynasty. [21] Only by learningfrom the powerful West(as well as Japan) and taking advantage of all theexisting resources would the goal of “saving the nation and people” (jiuguo baozliong) be possibly achieved. [22]Thus, reform and modernization bylearning from the West and Japan to preserve the Chinese culture andcivilization gradually attained widely acknowledged legitimacy through manydebates with respecting to China's modem state-building processes, includingboth domestic affairs and international relations.
  Specific to the late Qing period in 1840-1911, many contacts, correspondinggovernmental organs, and unequal treaties were established with the West,[23]while the late Qing government was still actually functioning on the basis of thetraditional Chinese world order and considered the Western-dominatedinternational law merely as diplomatic tools to save itself in the Sino-Westconflicts. [24] That is, the fundamental conflicts of worldview and governanceparadigms(including specific diplomatic protocols, general principles, etc.)between international law in ancient China(within the tribute system) and theWestern -dominated international law(within the Westphalian system) remainedunchanged. Such “normative rejection of international law” was partaken notonly by China but also Western powers, so as to deny China a civilizedsovereign state in the “family of nations” and thus realize their goal of politicaloppression and economic exploitation. [25]
  With the compelling mission to reform the country and save the people against constant military defeats and concessions to foreign powers since theOpium War,[26]“learning Western science and technology on the basis ofChinese culture and learning”(zhongti xiyong) during the Self-StrengtheningMovement in the 1860s-1890s was initiated, despite that it failed by the defeatof China in the First Sino-Japanese War (jiawu zhanzheng) in 1894-1895. [27]Subsequently, the Chinese people became increasingly skeptical of thetraditional Chinese cultural and political system. [28] With more Western ideaspouring into the society, the Western-dominated international law and worldorder partially replaced the traditional Chinese world order and international lawsystem in China and East Asia.[29] After the collapse of the Qing dynasty andestablishment of the ROC in 1912, the Chinese governments and diplomatswere determined to enter into the family of“civilized”nations and takeadvantage of the Western-dominated international law to protect Chinesenational interests, despite their repeated failures.[30]
  2. 2 China's Approaches to International Law during the Republic ofChina in 1912-1949
  In the era of the ROC in 1912-1949 and since the establishment of thePRC in 1949, there have been some changes in China's specific approaches to theWestern-dominated international law and world order as a result of differentideologies, governments, etc. However, the underlying themes of all of theseadministrations remain the same: modern state building, entering into the family of nations and achieving national rejuvenation for the Chinese people.[31]
  Under the context of the First World War, the Beiyang government(1913-1928) of the ROC attempted to use the Western-dominated international legalrules to protect its territorial integrity and other sovereign rights, but failed inthe face of power politics, [32] particularly the “Twenty-One Demands” made byJapan in 1915. Western powers ignored China's opposition to Japan's aggression,and Japan's acquisition of Shandong and other demands were granted.[33]Consequently, China refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles and the MayFourth Movement broke out in 1919, which contributed to the Chinesecommunist movement;[34] the Chinese people began to reconsider the nature ofWestern civilization and Western-dominated international law.[35] Thus, theChinese government and people were reminded that the Western-dominatedinternational law is no more than one of the tools and accomplices of colonialism,imperialism, international oppression and exploitation, power politics, etc.
  The Kuomintang government(1925-1948) of the ROC led the Chinesepeople to victory in the War of Resistance against Japan(1937-1945),[36] andsucceeded in maintaining that its borders were essentially those of the Qing (minusonly Outer Mongolia) through pragmatic diplomacy and application of the Western-dominated international law, especially in terms of Tibet, Xinjiang and Manchuria. [37]However, the hope of abolishing unequal treaties imposed by Western powers inaccordance with the doctrine of rebus sic standibus, particularly the problem ofextraterritoriality and China as a “civilized” sovereign state,[38] was frustrated for along time until the height of the Second World War (under the context of the USjoining the Allies in 1941) and the establishment of the PRC. [39]
  2. 3 China's Approaches to International Law during the People'sRepublic of China in 1949-1978
  China's approaches to international law in the PRC period of 1949-1978could be understood by examining its attitudes towards the existing world orderand foreign policies towards Western countries (especially the US) at that time.Generally, China's attitudes and approaches to the Western-dominatedinternational law were manifested through several aspects: the reexamination ofprevious treaties concluded by the Kuomintang and Qing government, the“leaning to one side” policy, the doctrine of anti-imperialism, anti-hegemonism,anti-colonialism and support for the national independence movement, “ThreeWorlds Theory”, and “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence”.[40]
  In particular, the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” representsChina's most fundamental and significant approach to Western-dominatedinternational law after its long struggle during the semi-colonial times since theOpium War: no humiliation, political oppression or economic exploitation bythe Western powers towards an independent new China anymore. [41] Aninteresting perspective is that these five principles, such as the principle ofsovereignty, non-aggression and non-interference, have already been alleged aspre-existing fundamental legal principles in the Western-dominated internationallaw, despite that they are merely considered to be formal and abstract legalrules(or even rhetorics) on the books rather than in action towards non-Western nations. [42] Comparatively, China's emphasis on the “Five Principlesof Peaceful Co-existence”appears to be more substantive and anti-hegemonistic, particularly among different countries at different developmentalstages and from different civilizations. [43]
  Article 54 of the Common Program of the Chinese People's PoliticalConsultative Conference(“CPCPPCC”),which was the provisional constitutionfrom 1949 to 1954, provided as follows.
  “The principle of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of Chinais protection of the independence,户eedom, integrity of territory andsovereignty of the country, upholding of lasting international peace andfriendly co-operation between the peoples of all countries, and oppositionto the imperialist policy of aggression and war.”
  Also, the preamble of the 1954 Constitution of the PRC, which was the firstconstitution of the PRC during 1954-1975 based on the CPCPPCC adopted in1949, provided the following, in line with article 56 and 57 of the CPCPPCC.
  “Our country's policy of establishing and extending diplomaticrelations with all countries on the principles of equality, mutual benefitand respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity hasalready yielded success and will continue to be carried out.”
  On the basis of the“World Revolution” approach to the existing worldorder in 1965 and the “Three Worlds Theory” firstly raised by Mao Zedong in1974,[44] Mao's attitudes towards the West(and even the whole “Other”) wereboth radical and conservative, idealistic and realistic, as well as succeeding andnegating the previous methods and experiences. [45]That is, ideologicalconcerns, as well as nationalism and internationalism, were operatingsimultaneously in the making of China's worldview and foreign policies(whichwas dominated by Mao in 1949-1976).For example, the “leaning to one side”policy in the 1950s was based on both ideological reasons and realistic concernsof national interests, while the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s was more aboutthe leadership of international communist movement. [46]The underlying motivations of the evolutionary approach to the existing world order wereideological concerns on the one hand, and institutional and realistic reasons onthe other hand, as the PRC had not participated in the formulation and design ofthe existing post-World War II, World order and its previous historicalexperiences during the“century of humiliation” led to substantial politicaldistrust of the West.
  Apparently, China was not only ideologically conservative and criticaltowards the existing international legal order(particularly imperialism and theUS) at the time, but also directly confrontational and rejective, as the Western-dominated international law has always been considered as the mouthpiece ofhegemonism, imperialism, international oppression and exploitation towardsnon-Western countries due to its low inclusiveness. Also, China was confidentin achieving national rejuvenation by confronting the existing Western-dominated world order. However, due to the revolutionary movements by Maoand other policies of ideological confrontation, China had stayed in poverty andthe dream of national rejuvenation had stranded for decades, with stigmatizationof both traditional Chinese culture and the Western-dominatedinternational law. [47]
  In October 1971,the PRC government replaced the ROC government asthe representative government of China in the United Nations(“UN”).Despiteits continuous hostility towards the UN and Western-dominated internationallegal system,[48] such as its non-recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction ofthe International Court of Justice(“ICJ”) in 1972,[49]China gradually startedto engage with and integrate into the Western-dominated international legalorder.
  In brief, during the PRC from 1949 to 1978, China was regarded as a communist threat and enemy to the Western-dominated world society. [50] Thatis, the West and China mutually denied the legitimacy of each other'sworldview and global governance paradigms. Not until Nixon's visit to China in1972 and later the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the PRCand US in 1979 did the PRC and US build a bridge that facilitated mutualrecognition, respect and benefits(rather than mutual hostility).[51] In thecontext of the Chinese domestic national policy of “reform and opening-up”,China became increasingly more open to the West and international communityafter 1978.
  2.4 China's Approaches to International Law during the People'sRepublic of China since 1978
  Since 1978, with the new national policy of “reform and opening-up”, thefocus of Chinese fundamental domestic policies changed from “class struggle” toeconomic development, as China's new leaders(especially Deng Xiaoping)believed that peace and development(rather than war and revolution) are themajor themes of this era and also the two primary needs of China. [52] China'sforeign policies returned to the pragmatic approach of “independent foreignpolicy of peace”, which includes four points:(1) To safeguard its independence,sovereignty and territorial integrity;(2)Anti-hegemonism for world peace;(3) Promoting the establishment of a more democratic and equitable newinternational political and economic order; (4) Upholding the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. [53]
  Deng Xiaoping believed that China's national rejuvenation, particularlyeconomic reform and development for the purpose of“fourmodernizations”,[54] could only be realized within the existing Western-dominated world order and international legal system.[55] Therefore, under hisguideline of “keep a low profile and achieve something”(taoguang yanghui,yousuo zuowei),[56] China's goal is to achieve economic and political reformwithin the framework of the Western-dominated world order and internationallaw by general learning from the West and effective sinicization to meet theneeds of China “with Chinese characteristics”. [57] Thus, China's approach tointernational law has become pragmatically taking advantage of the existinginternational law to achieve economic and political reform for the purpose ofnational rejuvenation. [58] Therefore, China has deeply embraced the Western-dominated international economic order but rejects comprehensive participationin international human right law, international dispute settlement through(quasi-] judicial means, international criminal law and other sensitive areas ofinternational law. It is evidently that China remains in the past shadow of“economic exploitation and political oppression” of foreign powers by virtue ofinternational law as a language of power and interests. To a large extent, the independent and peaceful path of economic development and political reform“with Chinese characteristics” since 1978 is a modified version of the “learningWestern science and technology on the basis of Chinese culture and learning”(zhongti xiyong) movement in the 1860s-1890s, in spite of different contexts,narratives and concrete tactics.
  Afterwards, different leaders of the PRC have consistently renewed andinterpreted these principles by adopting specific policies and new concepts indifferent contexts and for various needs, such as“China as the largestdeveloping country”, [59]“China's peaceful development” and“building aharmonious world”,[60]“China's core interests”, [61]“new type of great powerrelations”, [62] “never seek hegemony”,[63] “great rejuvenation of the Chinesenation” and “Chinese dream”, [64] “two centennial goals”,[65] and “community of shared future for mankind”. [66] The final goal has always been to(re-)emerge as a great power and effectively achieve national rejuvenation withoutdirect confrontation with the West or existing international legal system inaccordance with Deng's guideline.
  In June 2016, Russia and China adopted a declaration on the promotion ofinternational law to “ enhance their cooperation in upholding and promotinginternational law and in establishing a just and equitable international orderbased on international law”, which emphasized the “principles of internationallaw" and criticized double standards in the Western-dominated internationallaw. [67] This declaration is in line with previous China-Russia joint statementsmade in 1997, 2005, 2008, etc. [68] As China and Russia have always consideredthe existing Western-dominated international legal system as a hegemonic toolwith structural biases that allow the dominance of the West, this vividlyillustrates the divergences and struggles among different approaches tointernational law by Western and non-Western powers. [69] China has beencommitted to the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and has adhered tothe establishment of a “New International Economic Order” as a result of itshistorical sufferings and traditional worldviews.
  2.5 Concluding Remarks
  It is always constructive and rational to understand the current situations ofinternational law within the contexts of the historical interaction between Chinaand the West in order to formulate general frameworks of and accurate insightsinto the past, present and future. Comparatively, progress in scientifictechnologies amidst the industrialization and modernization processes could berealized in a prompter way than changes in the culture of nations. There is noquestion that China has made significant progress in industrialization andmodernization within the last century(particularly since 1978),but there ismuch continuity warranted between traditional and contemporary China on thecultural aspects of its fundamental worldviews and national identity. [70]Thelegal system, particularly international law as the extension of domesticgovernance culture in a certain civilization, could illustrate that point. [71]Thisconnection and contextualization are necessary for historical and criticalunderstandings of the contemporary international law and future world order,particularly in light of China’s experiences in its late modern history and therise of China in the twenty-first century.
  Therefore, along with the increased engagement and interaction withWestern powers and the Western-dominated international law since the OpiumWar, China's fundamental perspectives and approaches to international law havebeen accumulatively and substantively formed since the late Qing. That is,might is right, which has been exemplified through the Western-dominatedinternational law—the accomplice of political oppression and economicexploitation as a language of power and interests. [72] China has to learn fromthe West and take advantage of the Western-dominated international law to enter into“the family of civilized nations”.[73] Specifically, regarding itsgeneral attitudes, China has been interacting with the Western-dominatedinternational law in a reluctant, instrumental and pragmatic way since the OpiumWar; on its historical engagement, China has taken advantage of the Western-dominated international law in a historically critical and culturally conservativeway as a result of its past experiences of political oppression and economicexploitation; with regard to the continuities and changes in its participation,China has been a passive resistor, progressive taker and proactive maker of theWestern-dominated international law. Lastly, the final goal of China'sparticipation in the global society and interaction with the Western-dominatedinternational law has always been national rejuvenation. China's critical andconservative attitudes towards the Western-dominated international law havealways been affected by the modern history of“century of humiliation”.Therefore, China's emphasis on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence,hostility to international(quasi-) judicial dispute settlement mechanisms, itsdesire to learn from the West and also reform the current Western-dominatedinternational law system for a more democratic and equitable world order, etc.,demonstrate well China's fundamental approaches to international law.
  Thus, it is apparent that there are lines of continuities and changes inChina's approach to international law from ancient China, late modern China tothe present, as Chinese perceptions of the Western-dominated international laware based on many aspects that are inherited and reinforced as components ofChina's history, culture, worldview and national identity. [74] As the world's oldest continuous civilization pushing through thick and thin, China has beenevolutionary in its foreign policy, worldview and culture of governance.Understanding the origins and forces in Chinese culture and history provides aframework for the lines of continuities and changes in China's approaches tothe Western-dominated international law since the Opium War.
  3 China's Approaches to International Criminal Law: AHistorical Perspective
  International criminal law is an excellent example to illustrate the historicalorigins, contemporary dynamics and future developments of China's approaches tointernational law. Many academics have provided insightful analyses on theinvolvement, interests, concerns and attitudes of China towards the legal rules andregimes in the field of international criminal law, including Liu Daqun(2012),Jia Bingbing(2006),Jia Qingguo(2003),Lu Jianping & Wang Zhixiang(2005),Guan Jing(2009),Jonathan E. Davis(2011),Zhu Dan(2015),etc. For example,Zhu Dan examines China's concerns with regard to the role of the United NationsSecurity Council(“UNSC”) in the determination of an act of aggression anddefinition of the crime of aggression, arguing that China has hovered back andforth between two conflicting legal positions due to policy preferences and thatthe crime of aggression should not be regarded as an insurmountable barrierpreventing China's accession to the International Criminal Court(“ICC”) despitethe risk of the politicization of international criminal law and in light of thebenefits of positive engagement with the ICC. [75]
  Also, other related research works on Asian countries' attitudes tointernational criminal law, the evolution of China's position on humanitarianintervention(and the responsibility to protect),etc.,are illuminating. Forexample, Simon Chesterman points out that the Eurocentric history of internationalcriminal law has effaced Asian experiences of the“inherent tension between legitimacy and effectiveness in international criminal trials” that can be illustratedby the pragmatic adaptation of international norms to local political needs invarious Asian jurisdictions, and he argues that questions of legal doctrine are lesssignificant in determining attitudes towards international criminal law than thepolitical context in Asia, as Asian countries hold the wariness of Westerndominance and universal institutions' inadaptation to local political needs. [76]
  This section focuses on China's engagement with international criminal law,particularly international criminal tribunals, so as to analyze China's approachesto international criminal law in light of the Chinese(rather than European)history of international law since the Opium War.
  3. 1 China's Participation in International Criminal Tribunals andSpecial Courts
  China has been participating in the development of international criminallaw since the International Military Tribunal for the Far East(“Tokyo Trials”)in 1946. The Kuomintang government of the ROC appointed Mei Ju-ao andHsiang Che-chun to respectively act as one of the judges and prosecutors in theTokyo Trials. [77] Also, other trials of war crimes were held in domestic militarytribunals in China in 1946-1948 and 1956, despite that only a few individualswere indicted and punished. [78] China's participation in these trials consolidatedthe world order of the post-World War II and cultivated the ro

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*PhD, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong, Email : zuoanlei20l0law@ gmail. com.

[1]See, e. g.,Jacques DeLisle, “China's Approach to International Law: A Historical Perspective”,American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, 2000, p. 267. For the avoidance ofdoubt, in this paper, the “Western-dominated international law” refers to the current international legal systemthat has been established and dominated by Western powers, namely, the Westphalian system;and“international law” also refers to the current international legal system, unless indicated otherwise. Also, the“Western-dominated international criminal law” and “international criminal law” should be accordinglyunderstood. Generally, international law is understood as “the rules of conduct regulating the intercourse of states”. Thus, there were (and still are) different international legal systems in various circles of civilizations,such as traditional Chinese international law within the tribute system in ancient China.爱法律,有未来

[2]See John Atkinson Hobson, Imperialism: A Study,Spokesman Books, 1902, p. 182; see Eric A. Posner and John Yon, “International Law and the Rise of China”, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2006, p. 1;see Barry Buzan, “China in International Society: Is‘Peaceful Rise’Possible?”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2010, p. 5.

[3]See, e. g.,Jia Bingbing, “China and the International Criminal Court: the Current Situation”,Singapore Year Book of International Law, Vol. 10, 2006, p. 87; Zhu Dan,“China, the Crime of Aggression, and the International Criminal Court”, Asian Journal of International Law, Vol. 5, No. 1,2015, p.94; Lu Jianping and Wang Zhixiang, “China's Attitude towards the ICC”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2005, p. 608; Guan Jing, “The ICC's Jurisdiction over War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts: An Insurmountable Obstacle for China's Accession”, Penn State International Law Review, Vol. 28, No.4, 2009, p. 703; Jonathan E. Davis, “From Ideology to Pragmatism: China's Position in Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol.44, 2011, p. 217.

[4]The Chinese history of the Western-dominated international law is an indispensable part of the global history of international law; see, e. g.,Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, “Introduction: Towards A Global History of International Law”, Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, eds.,The Oxford Handbook of The History of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 1.

[5]See Emmanuelle Jouannet, “ Universalism and Imperialism:The True-False Paradox of International Law?”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2007, pp. 379,406.

[6]See, e. g.,Phil C. W. Chan, China, State Sovereignty And International Legal Order, Leiden:Brill Nijhoff, 2015; Phil C. W. Chan, “China's Approaches to International Law since the Opium War”,Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2014, p. 859; Andrew Coleman and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto,“‘Westphalian' Meets‘Eastphalian' Sovereignty: China in a Globalized World”,Asian Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2013, p. 237; Hanqin Xue, Chinese Contemporary Perspectives On International Law: History, Culture And International Law, The Hague, Netherlands:Hague Academy of International Law, 2012; Rune Svarverud, International Law As A World Order In Late Imperial China:Translation, Reception And Discourse, 1847-1911, Brill, 2007; Tieya Wang,International Law In China: Historical And Contemporary Perspectives, Martinus Nijhoff, 1990.

[7]See Richard S. Horowitz, “International Law and State Transformation in China, Siam, and the Ottoman Empire during the Nineteenth Century”. Journal of World History, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2004, p. 445;see Hungdah Chiu, “Chinese Attitudes Toward International Law in the Post-Mao Era, 1978-1987”, The International Lawyer, Vol.21, No.4, 1987, p. 1127; Samuel S. Kim, “The Development of International Law in Post-Mao China: Change and Continuity”, Journal of Chinese Law, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1987, p. 117;see Michael Bennett, “The People's Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute”, Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, 1991, p. 425; DeLisle, supra note 1; see Posner and Yoo, supra note 2; Congyan Cai, “New Great Powers and International Law in the 21st Century”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2013, p. 755; see Wang Zonglai and Hu Bin, “China's Reform and Opening-up and International Law”, Chinese Journal of International Law,Vol. 9, No. 1, 2010, p. 193; see Xue Hanqin and Jin Qian, “International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System”, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 299; Congyan Cai, “International Law in Chinese Courts during the Rise of China”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 110, No.2, 2016, p. 269; see Ann Kent, “Compliance v. Cooperation: China and International Law”, Australian International Law Journal, Vol. 13, 2006, p. 19; Ann Kent, Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security, Stanford University Press, 2007.

[8]Martti Koskenniemi states that serious comparative study of international law would contribute to the overcoming of the Eurocentrism and the ideology critique of international law; see Martti Koskenniemi, “The Case for Comparative International Law”, Finnish Yearbook of International Law,Vol. 20, No. 1, 2009, p. 1; Lauri Malskoo, Russian Approaches to International Law, Oxford University Press, 2015. Anthea Roberts, et al.,“Comparative International Law: Framing the Field”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 109, No. 3, 2015,p.469.

[9]See, e. g.,DavidKennedy,TheDarkSidesof Virtue:ReassessingInternational Humanitarianism, Princeton University Press, 2004; David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power,Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016; Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology To Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, Cambridge University Press, 2005; Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann eds.,The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2016; Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters eds.,The Oxford Handbook of The History of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2012; Antony Anghie,Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2007; Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order,Cambridge University Press, 2004; Carlo Focarelli, International Law as Social Construct: The Struggle for Global Justice, Oxford University Press, 2012.

[10]For instance, on international law and language, see Anne-Charlotte Martineau, “The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law”, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 22,No. 1, 2009, p. 1; On international law and culture, see Sienho Yee and Jacques-Yvan Morin eds.,Multiculturalism and International Law: Essays in Honour of Edward Mcwhinney, Brill, 2009; Gustavo Gozzi, “History of International Law and Western Civilization”, International Community Law Review,Vol. 9, No. 4, 2007, p. 353; Brett Bowden, “The Colonial Origins of International Law, European Expansion and the Classical Standard of Civilization”, Journal of the History of International Law, Vol.7, No. 1, 2005, p. 1;On the sociology of international law, see Bart Landheer, On the Sociology of International Law and International Society, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012; On international law and global governance, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman eds.,Ruling the World?Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, Cambridge University Press, 2009; On international law and international politics, see Michael Byers eds.,The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press,2000.

[11]See Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Post Colonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton University Press, 2000.

[12]See, e. g.,Michael Byers and Georg Nolte eds.,United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2003; see B. S. Chimni, “Asian Civilizations and International Law: Some Reflections”, Asian Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011, p. 39;Lauri Malksoo, “The History of International Legal Theory in Russia: a Civilizational Dialogue with Europe”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2008, p. 211; Onuma Yasuaki, “When Was the Law of International Society Born?—An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Intercivilizational Perspective”, Journal of the History of International Law, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2000, p. 1.

[13]Unless expressly stated otherwise in this paper, the “Opium War” refers to the First Opium War(1839-1842),also known as the Anglo-Chinese War.

[14]See John K. Fairbank,“Introduction:the Old Order”, in John K. Fairbank, eds.,The Cambridge History of China, Volume 10, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part 1, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 1-3.

[15]See Steve Tsang, A Modem History of Hong Kong, IB Tauris, 2007, pp. 3-13, 29.

[16]See Wang, supra note 6, at 238.

[17]See Alison Adcock Kaufman, “The‘Century of Humiliation', Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the International Order”, Pacific Focus, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2010, p. 1;Dong Wang, China's Unequal Treaties: Narrating National History, Lexington Books, 2005, pp. 1-i.

[18]See, e. g.,Boleslaw Adam Boczek, International Law: A Dictionary, Scarecrow Press, 2005,p.229; Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modem China, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970,p. 239; Stuart S. Malawer, Imposed Treaties and International Law, William S. Hein & Co., 1977, pp. 37,89-90; Wang, supra note 6, at 252-253.

[19]See Fairbank, supra note 14, at 3, 6.

[20]See, e. g.,Antony Anghie,“Finding the Peripheries:Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 40, 1999, p. 1; see ANGHIE, supra note 9.

[21]See Fairbank, supra note 14, at 3; see Chen Qineng and Jiang Peng, “Georg G. Iggers and the Changes in Modem Chinese Historiography”, in Q. Edward Wang and Franz L. Fillafer, eds.,The Many Faces of Clio: Cross-Cultural Approaches to Historiography, Essays in Honor of Georg G. Iggers,Berghahn Books, 2007, pp. 233, 235.

[22]For instance, the Hundred days' Reform movement in 1898. The renowned intellectual, Qichao Liang, argued about the necessity and urgency of reform in his famous series of articles titled “General Ideas on Reform” (bianfa tongyi] in 1896-1899. Also, Hongzhang Li, a prominent Chinese politician,general and diplomat in the late Qing, argued for political reform and modernization so as to preserve the Chinese civilization against invasions of Western powers and Japan.

[23]For example, the Zongli Yamen, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Qing Dynasty, was founded in 1861 in charge of the foreign affairs in imperial China during the late Qing dynasty; see, e. g.,Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, China's Entrance into the Family of Nations, the Diplomatic Phase, 1858-1880,Harvard University Press, 1960, pp. 121-123; Arnulf Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law: A Global Intellectual History 1842-1933, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 114-117.

[24]See Douglas Reynolds, China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan, Harvard University Press, 1993; see Stephen R. Mackinnon, Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shi-Kai in Beijing and Tianjin, 1901-1908, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

[25]See Chan, supra note 6, at 868. Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of “Civilization”in International Society, Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 146, 164.

[26]See Wang, supra note 6, at 251.

[27]See Allen Fung, “Testing the Self-Strengthening: The Chinese Army in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1996, p. 1007.

[28]See Charlotte Furth, “Intellectual Change: From the Reform Movement to the May Fourth Movement, 1895-1920”, in John K. Fairbank, eds.,The Cambridge History of China, Volume 12,Republican China 1912-1949, Part 1, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 322-405.

[29]See Li Zhaojie, International Law in China: Legal Aspect of the Chinese Perspective of World Order, Thesis(S. J. D.),University of Toronto (Canada),1996, p. 87.

[30]For instance, at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the Western powers refused China's claims and transferred the Germany's concessions on Shandong to Japan instead.

[31]For example, both the governments support and inherit the Three Principles of the People (nationalism, democracy, and the livelihood of the people) developed by Sun Yat-sen as part of the philosophy to make China a free, prosperous, and powerful nation; see Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat-Sen: His Life and its Meaning: A Critical Biography,Stanford University Press, 1968, pp. 94, 271.

[32]For example, China invoked Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to defend its sovereign rights over the Manchuria against Japan to 1931. Also, China terminated the “unequal treaties”concluded with Belgium in accordance with Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the doctrine of rebus sic standibus in 1926.

[33]See Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919,Princeton University Press, 2015, pp. 333-334

[34]See, e. g.,Rocky M. Mirza, The Rise and Fall of the American Empire: A Re-Interpretation of History, Economics and Philosophy: 1492-2006, Trafford Publishing, 2007, p. 332; Xu Guoqi,“China and Empire”, in Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela, eds.,Empires at War: 1911-1923, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 233.

[35]See Furth, supra note 28, at 402.

[36]It is also known as “the Second Sino-Japanese War”, as opposed to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.

[37]See William C. Kirby, “The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations at home and abroad in the Republican Era”, The China Quarterly, Vol. 150, 1997, pp. 433, 437; see Chan, supra note6, at 871-72.

[38]See, e. g.,Harold Scott Quigley,“Extraterritoriality in China”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1926, p. 46.

[39]See Wang, supra note 6, at 248, 261-262; see Cordell Hull, “China-United States: Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters”, AmericanJournal of International Law, Vol. 37, 1943, p. 65.

[40]See Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Adopted by the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's PCC on September 29th. 1949, Article 55. Between thespring and summer of 1949, Chairman Mao Zedong advanced three major principles of foreign policy,including “starting a new”, “putting the house in order before inviting guests” and “leaning to one side”;see Shi Zhiyu, China's Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy, Lynne Rienner Publishers,1993, p. 4; see Sandra Gillespie, “Diplomacy on a South-South Dimension: The Legacy of Mao's Three Worlds Theory and the Evolution of Sino-African Relations”, in Hannah Slavik, eds.,Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy, Diplo Foundation, 2004, p. 123; see Xue Hanqin, “Chinese Observations on International Law”, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2007, pp. 83, 85-86. The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence include mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.

[41]See Chen Tiqiang, “The People's Republic of China and Public International Law”, Dalhousie Law Journal, Vol. 8, 1984, pp. 3, 24-27; see Hungdah Chiu, “Communist China's Attitude TowardInternational Law”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 60, No. 2, 1966, p. 245.

[42]See, e. g.,ANGHIE, supra note 9. (The improvised sovereignty doctrine)

[43]See Thomas Cieslik, “The Role of Greater China in Latin America”, in Guo Sujian and Guo Baogang, eds.,Greater China in an Era of Globalization, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010, pp. 161-184;Young-Chan Kim, China and Africa: A New Paradigm of Global Business, Springer, 2017, pp. 130-131.

[44]See People's Daily, “Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism”, November 1,1977; see Chen Jian, “China and the Bandung Conference: Changing Perceptions and Representations”, in Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds.,Bandung Relast accessed at: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order,Nus Press, 2008, pp. 144-146.

[45] See, e. g,Li Jie, “Changes in China's Domestic Situation in the 1960s and Sino-U. S.Relations”, in Robert S. Ross and Changbin Jiang, eds.,Re-Examining the Cold War: U. S.—China Diplomacy, 1954-1973, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001, pp. 317-319; Feng Huiyun, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War, Routledge, 2007, pp. 47, 59; Carol Lee Hamrin, “Elite Politics and the Development of China's Foreign Relations”, in Thomas W. Robinson and David L. Shambaugh, eds.,Chinese Foreign Policy:Theory and Practice, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 70-109.

[46]See Frederick C. Teiwes, “Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime”, in Roderick Macfarquhar and John K. Fairbank eds.,The Cambridge History of China, Volume 14, The People's Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949-1965, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 65; Allen S. Whiting, “The Sino-Soviet Split”, in Roderick Macfarquhar and John K.Fairbank, eds,The Cambridge History of China, Volume 14, The People's Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949-1965, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 478-538.

[47]See Hungdah Chin, “Communist China's Attitude toward International Law”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 60, No. 2, 1966, p. 245.

[48]See Natalie G. Lichtenstein, “The People's Republic of China and Revision of the United Nations Charter”, Harv. Int'l. Lj, Vol. 18, 1977, p. 629.

[49]See Chan, supra note 6, at 886.

[50]See Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union,1948-1972, Stanford University Press, 1990, p. 1.

[51]See Yukinori Komine, Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China, Routledge, 2008, p. 223; see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China,“Nixon's China's Visit and‘Sino-U. S. Joint Communique’”, available at http: //www. fmprc. gov. cn/mfa eng/ziliao 665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18006. shtml, last accessed at June 1, 2018.

[52]See Christopher Howe, et al.,China's Economic Reform: A Study with Documents,Psychology Press, 2003, p. 80; Yang Yi, “Modernization of China's National Defense”, in Wang Yizhou,ed.,Transformation of Foreign Affairs and International Relations in China, 1978-2008, Brill, 2011, pp.241-242.

[53]It is also called China's “Independent and Peaceful Development Strategy”; see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, “China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace”,September 19,2003, available at http: //www. fmprc. gov. cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/zcyjs_663346/xgxw_663348/t24942. shtml, last accessed at June 1, 2018.

[54]The Four Modernizations include the modernization of agriculture, industry, science,technology, and the military

[55]See Li Mingjiang, “Rising from Within: China's Search for a Multilateral World and Its Implications for Sino-US Relations”, Global Governance, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2011, p. 331.

[56]See, e. g,Yan Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2014, pp. 153, 184.

[57]See, e. g.,Zhu Liqun, “China and International System: Two-way Socialization under the Logic of Practice”, in Zhao Jinjun and Chen Zhirui, eds.,China and the International Society:Adaptation and Self-Consciousness, World Scientific, 2014, pp. 41-42.

[58]See Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 56-57.

[59]For example, China had argued for recognition as a developing country throughout its accession processes into the WTO, despite that China, for the most part, was not accorded the special treatment permitted by developing country status; see Xue, supra note 6, at 94, 169, 200.

[60]See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, China Issues White Paperon Peaceful Development, September 7, 2011, available at http: //www. fmprc. gov. cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/whitepaper_665742/t856325. shtml, last accessed at June 1, 2018.

[61]See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, Reform, or Retrogression?, Routledge, 2015, pp. 193-194; see Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Can China Defend a‘Core Interest' in the South China Sea?”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2011, p.45.

[62]See Wang Yi, Peaceful Development and the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation, March 11, 2014, available at http: //www. ciis. org. cn/english/2014-03/11 /content _ 6733151. htm, last accessed at June 1, 2018; see Qi Hao, “China Debates the‘New Type of Great Power Relations’”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2015, p. 349.

[63]See Chen Dingding and Wang Jianwei, “Lying Low No More?—China's New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy”, China: An International Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2011, pp. 195, 198.

[64]See Zheng Wang, “Not Rising, But Rejuvenating: The‘Chinese Dream’”, February 05,2013, The Diplomat, available at http: //thediplomat. com/2013/02/chinese-dream-draft/, last accessed at June 1,2018.

[65]See, e. g.,Timothy R. Heath, China's New Governing Party Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of National Rejuvenation, Routledge, 2016, p. 218; The Two Centennial Goals, available at http: //www. china. org. cn/english/china -key _ words/2014-11/18/content_34158771.htm, last accessed at June 1, 2018.

[66]See, e. g.,Xinhua News, “Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind”, Speech by H. E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China, at the United Nations Office at Geneva, Geneva, 18 January 2017, available at http: //news. xinhuanet. com/english/2017-01/19/c_135994707. him, last accessed at June 1, 2018.

[67]Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the Promotion of International Law, UN Doc. S/2016/600

[68]See Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation On Major International Issues, 23 May 2008; Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the International Order of the 21stCentury, 1 July 2005; Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on A Multi-polar World and the Establishment of A New International Order, 23 April 1997.

爬数据可耻

[69]See Lauri Mhlksoo, “Russia and China Challenge the Western Hegemony in the Interpretationof International Law”, EJIL: Talk!,July 15, 2016, available at https: //www. ejiltalk. org/russia-and-china-challenge-the-western-hegemony-in-the-interpretation-of-international-law/, last accessed at June 1,2018; see Ingrid Wuerth, “China, Russia, and International Law”, July 11, 2016, available at https://www. lawfareblog. com/china-russia-and-tntemational-law, last accessed at June 1, 2018; see Fu Ying and Wu Shicun, “South China Sea: How We Got to This Stage”, The National Interest, May 9, 2016.

[70]See, e. g,John K. Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution, 1800-1985, New York: Harper & Row, 1986, p. 367.

[71]See Benjamin I. Schwartz, “The Chinese Perception of World Order, Past and Present”, in John K. Fairbank, eds.,The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations, Cambridge,Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 276.

[72]See Wang, supra note 6, at 248.

[73]See, e. g.,Zhang Yongjin, “China's Entry into International Society: Beyond the Standard of ‘Civilization'”,Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1991,p. 3; Chan, supra note 6, at 77.

[74]See Schwartz, supra note 71,at 287. For example, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, Chinese understandings on the “democratic deficits” of the Western-dominated international legal system and global governance paradigms, etc.,have been essential components of Chinese perceptions towards the Western-dominated international law and global governance. Their underlying origins are from traditional Chinese worldview of “world order under the heaven”(“tianxia”),and the utopian goal of “great peace” (“da tong”), etc. The concept of “Community of Common Destiny”( “mingyun gongtongti”) initiated by Chinese President Xi Jinping also demonstrates Chinese worldview,final goal and proposed global governance paradigms in contrast with those Western analogs.

[75]See Zhu, supra note 3.

[76]See Simon Chesterman, “International Criminal Law with Asian Characteristics?” Colum. J. Asian L.,Vol. 27, 2013, p. 129.

[77]See Song Zhiyong, “On Certain Issues Related to Tokyo Trial”, in The Tokyo Research Center, eds.,The Tokyo Trial: Recollections and Perspectives from China, Cambridge University Press,2016, p. 80.

[78]See Brendan Howe and Boris Kondoch, eds.,The Legality and Legitimacy of the Use of Force in Northeast Asia, Brill, 2013, pp. 22, 52; John Dower, Ways of Forgetting, Ways of Remembering: Japan in the Modem World, The New Press, 2012, p. 126; Liu Daqun, “Chinese Humanitarian Law and International Humanitarian Law”, in Larissa van den Herik and Carsten Stahn, eds.,The Diversification and Fragmentation of International Criminal Law, Martins Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, pp. 354-355.

[79]See Boleslaw Adam Boczek, International Law: A Dictionary, Scarecrow Press, 2005, p. 370.Before 1984, Hsu Mo (Xu Mo) and Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun) from the ROC had held positions in the ICJ respectively in 1946-1956 and 1956-1967.

[80]There are also other judges from China in other international tribunals, such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”).Specifically, Zhao Lihai ( 1996-2000), Xu Guangjian(2001-2007) and Gao Zhiguo (2008-)have held positions in the ITLOS

[81]For example, China appeared before the ICJ for the first time in the oral hearings on the Kosovo case, held in December 2009. The Chinese Government filed a Written Statement, and considered it necessary to “make an oral statement on some important issues of international law”. See ICJ, On theAccordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo(Request for advisory opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations), CR 2009/29, 28. Also, China took part in the advisory proceedings before the ITLOS for the first time in 2010; see ITLOS, Case No. 17, Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area (Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), Written Statement of the People's Republic of China, August 18,2010.

[82]See UNSC, Resolution 827(1993), Adopted by the Security Council at its 3217th meeting, on 25 May 1993, S/RES/827 (1993).

[83]See UNSC, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and Seventeenth Meeting, 25 May 1993, S/PV. 3217, 33-34.

[84]See UNSC, Resolution 955(1994),Adopted by the Security Council at its 3453rd meeting, on 8 November 1994, S/RES/955 (1994).

[85]See UNSC, 3453rd Meeting, 8 November 1994, S/PV. 3453, 11.

[86]See UNSC, Resolution 1966 (2010), Adopted by the Security Council at its 6463rd meeting,on22 December 2010, S/RES/1966 (2010);see UNSC, 6463rd meeting, 22 December 2010, S/PV.6463.

[87]See UNSC, Letter dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 10 August 2000, S/2000/786; see UNSC, Resolution 1315 (2000),Adopted by the Security Council at its 4186th meeting, on 14 August 2000, S/RES/1315 (2000);see UNSC, 4186th meeting, 14 August 2000, S/PV. 4186; see Micaela Frulli,“The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Some Preliminary Comments”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2000, p. 857.

[88]See UNSC, Letter dated 13 December 2005 from the Charge d'affaires a. i. of the Permanent `Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary -General, 13 December 2005, S/2005/783; see UNSC, Resolution 1664 (2006), Adopted by the Security Council at its 5401st meeting, on 29 March 2006, S/RES/1664 (2006);see UNSC, 5401st meeting, 29 March 2006, S/PV. 5401; see UNSC, Resolution 1757 (2007),Adopted by the Security Council at its 5685th meeting, on 30 May 2007,S/RES/1757 (2007).

[89]See UNSC, 5685th meeting, 30 May 2007, S/PV. 5685, 4-5. China abstained along with Indonesia, Qatar, Russian Federation, and South Africa.

[90]See UNGA, 57/228. Khmer Rouge trials, A/RES/57/228, 27 February 2003; see UNGA and UNSC, Identical letters dated 23 June 1997 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council, A/51/930, S/1997/488, 24 June 1997.

[91]See UNGA,57/228. Khmer Rouge trials, A/RES/57/228 B,22 May 2003; see UNGA, Fifty-seventh session, 85th plenary meeting, 13 May 2003, A/57/PV. 85.

[92]See UNSC, Resolution 1272(1999),Adopted by the Security Council at its 4057th meeting,on 25 October 1999, S/RES/1272(1999);see UNTAET, Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, UNTAET/REG/2000/15, 6 June 2000.

[93]See UNSC, 4057th Meeting, 25 October 1999, S/PV. 4057, 13.

[94]See UNSC, Resolution 1976 (2011), Adopted by the Security Council at its 6512th meeting,on 11 April 2011, S/RES/1976 (2011), 5-6; see UNSC, 6512th meeting, 1 1 April 2011, S/PV. 6512.

[95]See UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on the Modalities for the Establishment of Specialized Somali Anti-piracy Courts, 15 June 2011, S/2011/360.

[96]See UNSC, 6512th meeting, supra note 94, at 15-16.

[97]See Sarah M. H. Nouwen,“‘Hybrid Courts': The Hybrid Category of a New Type of International Crimes Courts”, Utrecht L. Rev.,Vol. 2, 2006, p. 190; Laura A. Dickinson, “The Promise of Hybrid Courts”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 2, 2003, p. 295; Harry Hobbs,“Hybrid Tribunals and the Composition of the Court: In Search of Sociological Legitimacy”, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2016, p. 482.

[98]See Sarah Williams, “The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers: A Dangerous Precedent for International Justice”, The International and Comparative Law, Vol. 53, No. 1,2001, p. 227, 229.(Regarding the situation in Cambodia, China would not oppose an international tribunal if requested by the Cambodian government, but would veto it if it is imposed on Cambodia.)

[99]See UNSC, 6512th meeting, supra note 94, at 15-16.

[100]China was a member of both the Drafting Committee and Credentials Committee. See UN,United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June-17 July 1998, Official Records, Volume I, II, III. A/CONF. 183/13.

[101]See UN, ibid.,Volume II, at 75.

[102]See UN, ibid.,Volume II, at 123-124

[103]See UNSC, Resolution 1593 [2005),Adopted by the Security Council at its 5158th meeting, on 31 March 2005, S/RES/1593.

[104]See UNSC, Resolution 1970 (2011),Adopted by the Security Council at its 6491st meeting, on 26 February 2011, S/RES/1970 (2011).

[105]See UNSC, 5158th meeting, 31 March 2005, S/PV. 5158, 5.

[106]See UNSC, 7180th meeting, 22 May 2014, S/PV. 7180, 4.

[107]See UNSC, 7180th meeting, 22 May 2014, S/PV. 7180, 13-14.

[108]See, e. g.,Pan Zhongqi, Conceptual Gaps, In China-Eu Relations: Global Governance Human Rights and Strategic Partnerships, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 58, 220.

[109]See, e. g.,Kristen Hessler, “State Sovereignty as an Obstacle to International Criminal Law”,in Larry May and Zachary Hoskins, eds.,International Criminal Law and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 47; Antonio Cassese, et al.,Cassese's International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 142.

[110]See Wang Yizhou, “Introduction”, in Wang Yizhou, ed.,Transformation of Foreign Affairs and International Relations in China, 1978-2008, Brill, 2011, p. 19.

[111]See, e. g.,David Kennedy, “The Mystery of Global Governance”, in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman, ed.,Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 37; Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” and the Entry of Non-European Countries into International Society: The Case of China, Japan, and Siam.

[112]See Tom J. Farer, “Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law”, American Journal of International Law, Vol.79, No. 2, 1985, p.405; see Anghie, supra note 9, at 320.

[113]See Martti Koskenniemi, ”The Politics of International Law—20 Years Later”, 20 European Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2009, p. 7.

[114]The inequality and injustice in the international political and economic life are the creatures of international law; see David Kennedy, “Law and the Political Economy of the World”, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, No. 1,2013, p.7.

[115]See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, 1997, pp. 24-29.

[116]See Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 33,1993, p. 22; see Edward W. Said, “The Clash of Ignorance”, The Nation, Vol. 22, No. 10, 2001, p. 1; seeKarim H. Karim and Mahmoud Eid, “Clash of Ignorance”, Global Media Journal—Canadian Edition,Vol. 5, No. 1,2012,p.7.

[117]See Urs Matthias Zachmann, “Does Europe Include Japan? European Normativity in Japanese Attitudes towards International Law, 1854-1945”, Rechtsgeschichte-Legal History, Vol. 22, 2014, p. 228.

[118]See Schwartz, supra note 71, at 276.

[119]See Kai Raustiala, “Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law”, UC Davis L. Rev.,Vol. 40, 2007, pp. 1021, 1026.

[120]See Nico Krisch, “International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2005, p. 369.

[121]See Gerald Chan, et al.,“China Engages Global Governance: A New World Order in TheMaking?”, Routledge, 2011;see Li Mingjfang eds.,China Joins Global Governance: Cooperation and Contentions, Rowman&Littlefield, 2012, p. 15.

[122]See Shintaro Hamanaka, “TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting”,Journal of East Asian Economic Integration, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2014, p. 163; see Stephen M. Young, “US-China Relations: Balancing Cooperation and Competition in the Most Important Bilateral Relationship in Both the Region and the World”, American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2015, p. 166; see Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on the‘One Belt, One Road' Initiative”, China Leadership Monitor, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2015,p.3.

[123]See, e. g.,Edmund S. K. Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity: Cultural and Political Thought in the Republican Era, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 27-60.

[124]These Chinese sayings had been used in public speeches by President Xi Jinping in 2016 and former Premier Wen Jiabao in 2008. They are quoted from the Classic of Poetry(shijing) and the Grades of Poetry (shipin),which are two classic books on Chinese traditional poetry and songs.

[125]For example, the so-called “one central task and two basic points”, which means focusing on economic development, adhering to the “Four Cardinal Principles” and “reform and opening-up” policy,has been established and reinforced for many times in the 13th, 15th and 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

[126]See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press,2006, p. 5.

[127]See Sherston Baker and H. W. Halleck, Halleck's International Law, or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War, London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1893.

[128]See Jia Bingbing, “A Synthesis of the Notion of Sovereignty and the Ideal of the Rule of Law: Reflections on the Contemporary Chinese Approach to International Law”, German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 53, 2010, p. 11.

[129]See Wim Muller, “China: An Illiberal, Non-Western State in a Western-centric, Liberal Order?”, Baltic Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2016, p. 216.

[130]To some extent, it means that China “expresses rhetorical support for the higher ideals of international law while acting conservatively and with a priority towards a narrowly defined set of interests, by consistently placing limits on the interpretation of norms and restraining any expansion of international institutional power in which it does not have a say”; see Muller, ibid; see Jochen von Bemstorff, “International Legal Scholarship as a Cooling Medium in International Law and Politics”,European Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2014, p. 989.

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