*PhD, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong, Email : zuoanlei20l0law@ gmail. com.
See, e. g.，Jacques DeLisle, “China's Approach to International Law: A Historical Perspective”,American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, 2000, p. 267. For the avoidance ofdoubt, in this paper, the “Western-dominated international law” refers to the current international legal systemthat has been established and dominated by Western powers, namely, the Westphalian system;and“international law” also refers to the current international legal system, unless indicated otherwise. Also, the“Western-dominated international criminal law” and “international criminal law” should be accordinglyunderstood. Generally, international law is understood as “the rules of conduct regulating the intercourse of states”. Thus, there were （and still are） different international legal systems in various circles of civilizations,such as traditional Chinese international law within the tribute system in ancient China.爱法律，有未来
See John Atkinson Hobson, Imperialism: A Study，Spokesman Books, 1902, p. 182; see Eric A. Posner and John Yon, “International Law and the Rise of China”, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2006, p. 1；see Barry Buzan, “China in International Society: Is‘Peaceful Rise’Possible?”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2010, p. 5.
See, e. g.，Jia Bingbing, “China and the International Criminal Court: the Current Situation”,Singapore Year Book of International Law, Vol. 10, 2006, p. 87; Zhu Dan,“China, the Crime of Aggression, and the International Criminal Court”, Asian Journal of International Law, Vol. 5, No. 1,2015, p.94; Lu Jianping and Wang Zhixiang, “China's Attitude towards the ICC”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2005, p. 608; Guan Jing, “The ICC's Jurisdiction over War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts: An Insurmountable Obstacle for China's Accession”, Penn State International Law Review, Vol. 28, No.4, 2009, p. 703; Jonathan E. Davis, “From Ideology to Pragmatism: China's Position in Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol.44, 2011, p. 217.
The Chinese history of the Western-dominated international law is an indispensable part of the global history of international law; see, e. g.，Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, “Introduction: Towards A Global History of International Law”, Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, eds.，The Oxford Handbook of The History of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 1.
See Emmanuelle Jouannet, “ Universalism and Imperialism:The True-False Paradox of International Law?”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2007, pp. 379,406.
See, e. g.，Phil C. W. Chan, China, State Sovereignty And International Legal Order, Leiden:Brill Nijhoff, 2015; Phil C. W. Chan, “China's Approaches to International Law since the Opium War”,Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2014, p. 859; Andrew Coleman and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto,“‘Westphalian' Meets‘Eastphalian' Sovereignty: China in a Globalized World”,Asian Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2013, p. 237; Hanqin Xue, Chinese Contemporary Perspectives On International Law: History, Culture And International Law, The Hague, Netherlands:Hague Academy of International Law, 2012; Rune Svarverud, International Law As A World Order In Late Imperial China:Translation, Reception And Discourse, 1847-1911, Brill, 2007; Tieya Wang,International Law In China: Historical And Contemporary Perspectives, Martinus Nijhoff, 1990.
See Richard S. Horowitz, “International Law and State Transformation in China, Siam, and the Ottoman Empire during the Nineteenth Century”. Journal of World History, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2004, p. 445;see Hungdah Chiu, “Chinese Attitudes Toward International Law in the Post-Mao Era, 1978-1987”, The International Lawyer, Vol.21, No.4, 1987, p. 1127; Samuel S. Kim, “The Development of International Law in Post-Mao China: Change and Continuity”, Journal of Chinese Law, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1987, p. 117;see Michael Bennett, “The People's Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute”, Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, 1991, p. 425; DeLisle, supra note 1; see Posner and Yoo, supra note 2; Congyan Cai, “New Great Powers and International Law in the 21st Century”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2013, p. 755; see Wang Zonglai and Hu Bin, “China's Reform and Opening-up and International Law”, Chinese Journal of International Law,Vol. 9, No. 1, 2010, p. 193; see Xue Hanqin and Jin Qian, “International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System”, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 299; Congyan Cai, “International Law in Chinese Courts during the Rise of China”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 110, No.2, 2016, p. 269; see Ann Kent, “Compliance v. Cooperation: China and International Law”, Australian International Law Journal, Vol. 13, 2006, p. 19; Ann Kent, Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security, Stanford University Press, 2007.
Martti Koskenniemi states that serious comparative study of international law would contribute to the overcoming of the Eurocentrism and the ideology critique of international law; see Martti Koskenniemi, “The Case for Comparative International Law”, Finnish Yearbook of International Law,Vol. 20, No. 1, 2009, p. 1; Lauri Malskoo, Russian Approaches to International Law, Oxford University Press, 2015. Anthea Roberts, et al.，“Comparative International Law: Framing the Field”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 109, No. 3, 2015，p.469.
See, e. g.，DavidKennedy,TheDarkSidesof Virtue:ReassessingInternational Humanitarianism, Princeton University Press, 2004; David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power,Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016; Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology To Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, Cambridge University Press, 2005; Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann eds.，The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2016; Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters eds.，The Oxford Handbook of The History of International Law, Oxford University Press, 2012; Antony Anghie,Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2007; Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order,Cambridge University Press, 2004; Carlo Focarelli, International Law as Social Construct: The Struggle for Global Justice, Oxford University Press, 2012.
For instance, on international law and language, see Anne-Charlotte Martineau, “The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law”, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 22,No. 1, 2009, p. 1; On international law and culture, see Sienho Yee and Jacques-Yvan Morin eds.，Multiculturalism and International Law: Essays in Honour of Edward Mcwhinney, Brill, 2009; Gustavo Gozzi, “History of International Law and Western Civilization”, International Community Law Review,Vol. 9, No. 4, 2007, p. 353; Brett Bowden, “The Colonial Origins of International Law, European Expansion and the Classical Standard of Civilization”, Journal of the History of International Law, Vol.7, No. 1, 2005, p. 1；On the sociology of international law, see Bart Landheer, On the Sociology of International Law and International Society, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012; On international law and global governance, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman eds.，Ruling the World?Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, Cambridge University Press, 2009; On international law and international politics, see Michael Byers eds.，The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press,2000.
See Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Post Colonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton University Press, 2000.
See, e. g.，Michael Byers and Georg Nolte eds.，United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2003; see B. S. Chimni, “Asian Civilizations and International Law: Some Reflections”, Asian Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011, p. 39;Lauri Malksoo, “The History of International Legal Theory in Russia: a Civilizational Dialogue with Europe”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2008, p. 211; Onuma Yasuaki, “When Was the Law of International Society Born?—An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Intercivilizational Perspective”, Journal of the History of International Law, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2000, p. 1.
Unless expressly stated otherwise in this paper, the “Opium War” refers to the First Opium War（1839-1842），also known as the Anglo-Chinese War.
See John K. Fairbank,“Introduction:the Old Order”, in John K. Fairbank, eds.，The Cambridge History of China, Volume 10, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part 1, Cambridge：Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 1-3.
See Steve Tsang, A Modem History of Hong Kong, IB Tauris, 2007, pp. 3-13, 29.
See Wang, supra note 6, at 238.
See Alison Adcock Kaufman, “The‘Century of Humiliation'， Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the International Order”, Pacific Focus, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2010, p. 1；Dong Wang, China's Unequal Treaties: Narrating National History, Lexington Books, 2005, pp. 1-i.
See, e. g.，Boleslaw Adam Boczek, International Law: A Dictionary, Scarecrow Press, 2005,p.229; Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modem China, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970,p. 239; Stuart S. Malawer, Imposed Treaties and International Law, William S. Hein ＆ Co.， 1977, pp. 37,89-90; Wang, supra note 6, at 252-253.
See Fairbank, supra note 14, at 3, 6.
See, e. g.，Antony Anghie,“Finding the Peripheries:Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 40, 1999, p. 1; see ANGHIE, supra note 9.
See Fairbank, supra note 14, at 3; see Chen Qineng and Jiang Peng, “Georg G. Iggers and the Changes in Modem Chinese Historiography”, in Q. Edward Wang and Franz L. Fillafer, eds.，The Many Faces of Clio: Cross-Cultural Approaches to Historiography, Essays in Honor of Georg G. Iggers,Berghahn Books, 2007, pp. 233, 235.
For instance, the Hundred days' Reform movement in 1898. The renowned intellectual, Qichao Liang, argued about the necessity and urgency of reform in his famous series of articles titled “General Ideas on Reform” （bianfa tongyi] in 1896-1899. Also, Hongzhang Li, a prominent Chinese politician,general and diplomat in the late Qing, argued for political reform and modernization so as to preserve the Chinese civilization against invasions of Western powers and Japan.
For example, the Zongli Yamen, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Qing Dynasty, was founded in 1861 in charge of the foreign affairs in imperial China during the late Qing dynasty; see, e. g.，Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, China's Entrance into the Family of Nations, the Diplomatic Phase, 1858-1880,Harvard University Press, 1960, pp. 121-123; Arnulf Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law: A Global Intellectual History 1842-1933, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 114-117.
See Douglas Reynolds, China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan, Harvard University Press, 1993; see Stephen R. Mackinnon, Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shi-Kai in Beijing and Tianjin, 1901-1908, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
See Chan, supra note 6, at 868. Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of “Civilization”in International Society, Oxford：Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 146, 164.
See Wang, supra note 6, at 251.
See Allen Fung, “Testing the Self-Strengthening: The Chinese Army in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1996, p. 1007.
See Charlotte Furth, “Intellectual Change: From the Reform Movement to the May Fourth Movement, 1895-1920”, in John K. Fairbank, eds.，The Cambridge History of China, Volume 12,Republican China 1912-1949, Part 1, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 322-405.
See Li Zhaojie, International Law in China: Legal Aspect of the Chinese Perspective of World Order, Thesis（S. J. D.），University of Toronto （Canada），1996, p. 87.
For instance, at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the Western powers refused China's claims and transferred the Germany's concessions on Shandong to Japan instead.
For example, both the governments support and inherit the Three Principles of the People （nationalism, democracy, and the livelihood of the people） developed by Sun Yat-sen as part of the philosophy to make China a free, prosperous, and powerful nation; see Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat-Sen: His Life and its Meaning: A Critical Biography，Stanford University Press, 1968, pp. 94, 271.
For example, China invoked Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to defend its sovereign rights over the Manchuria against Japan to 1931. Also, China terminated the “unequal treaties”concluded with Belgium in accordance with Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the doctrine of rebus sic standibus in 1926.
See Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919,Princeton University Press, 2015, pp. 333-334
See, e. g.，Rocky M. Mirza, The Rise and Fall of the American Empire: A Re-Interpretation of History, Economics and Philosophy: 1492-2006, Trafford Publishing, 2007, p. 332; Xu Guoqi,“China and Empire”, in Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela, eds.，Empires at War: 1911-1923, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 233.
See Furth, supra note 28, at 402.
It is also known as “the Second Sino-Japanese War”, as opposed to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.
See William C. Kirby, “The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations at home and abroad in the Republican Era”, The China Quarterly, Vol. 150, 1997, pp. 433, 437; see Chan, supra note6, at 871-72.
See, e. g.，Harold Scott Quigley,“Extraterritoriality in China”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1926, p. 46.
See Wang, supra note 6, at 248, 261-262; see Cordell Hull, “China-United States: Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters”, AmericanJournal of International Law, Vol. 37, 1943, p. 65.
See Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Adopted by the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's PCC on September 29th. 1949, Article 55. Between thespring and summer of 1949, Chairman Mao Zedong advanced three major principles of foreign policy,including “starting a new”, “putting the house in order before inviting guests” and “leaning to one side”;see Shi Zhiyu, China's Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy, Lynne Rienner Publishers,1993, p. 4; see Sandra Gillespie, “Diplomacy on a South-South Dimension: The Legacy of Mao's Three Worlds Theory and the Evolution of Sino-African Relations”, in Hannah Slavik, eds.，Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy, Diplo Foundation, 2004, p. 123; see Xue Hanqin, “Chinese Observations on International Law”, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2007, pp. 83, 85-86. The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence include mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.
See Chen Tiqiang, “The People's Republic of China and Public International Law”, Dalhousie Law Journal, Vol. 8, 1984, pp. 3, 24-27; see Hungdah Chiu, “Communist China's Attitude TowardInternational Law”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 60, No. 2, 1966, p. 245.
See, e. g.，ANGHIE, supra note 9. （The improvised sovereignty doctrine）
See Thomas Cieslik, “The Role of Greater China in Latin America”, in Guo Sujian and Guo Baogang, eds.，Greater China in an Era of Globalization, Rowman ＆ Littlefield Publishers, 2010, pp. 161-184;Young-Chan Kim, China and Africa: A New Paradigm of Global Business, Springer, 2017, pp. 130-131.
See People's Daily, “Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism”, November 1，1977; see Chen Jian, “China and the Bandung Conference: Changing Perceptions and Representations”, in Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds.，Bandung Relast accessed at: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order,Nus Press, 2008, pp. 144-146.
 See, e. g，Li Jie, “Changes in China's Domestic Situation in the 1960s and Sino-U. S.Relations”, in Robert S. Ross and Changbin Jiang, eds.，Re-Examining the Cold War: U. S．—China Diplomacy, 1954-1973, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001, pp. 317-319; Feng Huiyun, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War, Routledge, 2007, pp. 47, 59; Carol Lee Hamrin, “Elite Politics and the Development of China's Foreign Relations”, in Thomas W. Robinson and David L. Shambaugh, eds.，Chinese Foreign Policy:Theory and Practice, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 70-109.
See Frederick C. Teiwes, “Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime”, in Roderick Macfarquhar and John K. Fairbank eds.，The Cambridge History of China, Volume 14, The People's Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949-1965, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 65; Allen S. Whiting, “The Sino-Soviet Split”, in Roderick Macfarquhar and John K.Fairbank, eds，The Cambridge History of China, Volume 14, The People's Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949-1965, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 478-538.
See Hungdah Chin, “Communist China's Attitude toward International Law”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 60, No. 2, 1966, p. 245.
See Natalie G. Lichtenstein, “The People's Republic of China and Revision of the United Nations Charter”, Harv. Int'l. Lj, Vol. 18, 1977, p. 629.
See Chan, supra note 6, at 886.
See Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union,1948-1972, Stanford University Press, 1990, p. 1.
See Yukinori Komine, Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China, Routledge, 2008, p. 223; see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China,“Nixon's China's Visit and‘Sino-U. S. Joint Communique’”, available at http: //www. fmprc. gov. cn/mfa eng/ziliao 665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18006. shtml, last accessed at June 1, 2018.
See Christopher Howe, et al.，China's Economic Reform: A Study with Documents,Psychology Press, 2003, p. 80; Yang Yi, “Modernization of China's National Defense”, in Wang Yizhou,ed.，Transformation of Foreign Affairs and International Relations in China, 1978-2008, Brill, 2011, pp.241-242.
It is also called China's “Independent and Peaceful Development Strategy”; see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, “China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace”,September 19,2003, available at http: //www. fmprc. gov. cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/zcyjs_663346/xgxw_663348/t24942. shtml, last accessed at June 1, 2018.
The Four Modernizations include the modernization of agriculture, industry, science,technology, and the military
See Li Mingjiang, “Rising from Within: China's Search for a Multilateral World and Its Implications for Sino-US Relations”, Global Governance, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2011, p. 331.
See, e. g，Yan Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2014, pp. 153, 184.
See, e. g.，Zhu Liqun, “China and International System: Two-way Socialization under the Logic of Practice”, in Zhao Jinjun and Chen Zhirui, eds.，China and the International Society:Adaptation and Self-Consciousness, World Scientific, 2014, pp. 41-42.
See Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 56-57.
For example, China had argued for recognition as a developing country throughout its accession processes into the WTO, despite that China, for the most part, was not accorded the special treatment permitted by developing country status; see Xue, supra note 6, at 94, 169, 200.
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, China Issues White Paperon Peaceful Development, September 7, 2011, available at http: //www. fmprc. gov. cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/whitepaper_665742/t856325. shtml, last accessed at June 1, 2018.
See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, Reform, or Retrogression?, Routledge, 2015, pp. 193-194; see Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Can China Defend a‘Core Interest' in the South China Sea?”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2011, p.45.
See Wang Yi, Peaceful Development and the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation, March 11, 2014, available at http: //www. ciis. org. cn/english/2014-03/11 /content _ 6733151. htm, last accessed at June 1, 2018; see Qi Hao, “China Debates the‘New Type of Great Power Relations’”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2015, p. 349.
See Chen Dingding and Wang Jianwei, “Lying Low No More?—China's New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy”, China: An International Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2011, pp. 195, 198.
See Zheng Wang, “Not Rising, But Rejuvenating: The‘Chinese Dream’”, February 05,2013, The Diplomat, available at http: //thediplomat. com/2013/02/chinese-dream-draft/, last accessed at June 1,2018.
See, e. g.，Timothy R. Heath, China's New Governing Party Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of National Rejuvenation, Routledge, 2016, p. 218; The Two Centennial Goals, available at http: //www. china. org. cn/english/china -key _ words/2014-11/18/content_34158771．htm, last accessed at June 1, 2018.
See, e. g.，Xinhua News, “Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind”, Speech by H. E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China, at the United Nations Office at Geneva, Geneva, 18 January 2017, available at http: //news. xinhuanet. com/english/2017-01/19/c_135994707. him, last accessed at June 1, 2018.
Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the Promotion of International Law, UN Doc. S/2016/600
See Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation On Major International Issues, 23 May 2008; Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the International Order of the 21stCentury, 1 July 2005; Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on A Multi-polar World and the Establishment of A New International Order, 23 April 1997.
See Lauri Mhlksoo, “Russia and China Challenge the Western Hegemony in the Interpretationof International Law”, EJIL: Talk!，July 15, 2016, available at https: //www. ejiltalk. org/russia-and-china-challenge-the-western-hegemony-in-the-interpretation-of-international-law/, last accessed at June 1,2018; see Ingrid Wuerth, “China, Russia, and International Law”, July 11, 2016, available at https://www. lawfareblog. com/china-russia-and-tntemational-law, last accessed at June 1, 2018; see Fu Ying and Wu Shicun, “South China Sea: How We Got to This Stage”, The National Interest, May 9, 2016.
See, e. g，John K. Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution, 1800-1985, New York: Harper ＆ Row, 1986, p. 367.
See Benjamin I. Schwartz, “The Chinese Perception of World Order, Past and Present”, in John K. Fairbank, eds.，The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations, Cambridge,Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 276.
See Wang, supra note 6, at 248.
See, e. g.，Zhang Yongjin, “China's Entry into International Society: Beyond the Standard of ‘Civilization'”，Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1991，p. 3; Chan, supra note 6, at 77.
See Schwartz, supra note 71，at 287. For example, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, Chinese understandings on the “democratic deficits” of the Western-dominated international legal system and global governance paradigms, etc.，have been essential components of Chinese perceptions towards the Western-dominated international law and global governance. Their underlying origins are from traditional Chinese worldview of “world order under the heaven”（“tianxia”），and the utopian goal of “great peace” （“da tong”）, etc. The concept of “Community of Common Destiny”（ “mingyun gongtongti”） initiated by Chinese President Xi Jinping also demonstrates Chinese worldview,final goal and proposed global governance paradigms in contrast with those Western analogs.
See Zhu, supra note 3.
See Simon Chesterman, “International Criminal Law with Asian Characteristics?” Colum. J. Asian L.，Vol. 27, 2013, p. 129.
See Song Zhiyong, “On Certain Issues Related to Tokyo Trial”, in The Tokyo Research Center, eds.，The Tokyo Trial: Recollections and Perspectives from China, Cambridge University Press,2016, p. 80.
See Brendan Howe and Boris Kondoch, eds.，The Legality and Legitimacy of the Use of Force in Northeast Asia, Brill, 2013, pp. 22, 52; John Dower, Ways of Forgetting, Ways of Remembering: Japan in the Modem World, The New Press, 2012, p. 126; Liu Daqun, “Chinese Humanitarian Law and International Humanitarian Law”, in Larissa van den Herik and Carsten Stahn, eds.，The Diversification and Fragmentation of International Criminal Law, Martins Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, pp. 354-355.
See Boleslaw Adam Boczek, International Law: A Dictionary, Scarecrow Press, 2005, p. 370.Before 1984, Hsu Mo （Xu Mo） and Wellington Koo （Gu Weijun） from the ROC had held positions in the ICJ respectively in 1946-1956 and 1956-1967.
There are also other judges from China in other international tribunals, such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea （“ITLOS”）．Specifically, Zhao Lihai （ 1996-2000）, Xu Guangjian（2001-2007） and Gao Zhiguo （2008-）have held positions in the ITLOS
For example, China appeared before the ICJ for the first time in the oral hearings on the Kosovo case, held in December 2009. The Chinese Government filed a Written Statement, and considered it necessary to “make an oral statement on some important issues of international law”. See ICJ, On theAccordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo（Request for advisory opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the United Nations）, CR 2009/29, 28. Also, China took part in the advisory proceedings before the ITLOS for the first time in 2010; see ITLOS, Case No. 17, Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area （Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber）, Written Statement of the People's Republic of China, August 18,2010.
See UNSC, Resolution 827（1993）, Adopted by the Security Council at its 3217th meeting, on 25 May 1993, S/RES/827 （1993）．
See UNSC, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and Seventeenth Meeting, 25 May 1993, S/PV. 3217, 33-34.
See UNSC, Resolution 955（1994），Adopted by the Security Council at its 3453rd meeting, on 8 November 1994, S/RES/955 （1994）.
See UNSC, 3453rd Meeting, 8 November 1994, S/PV. 3453, 11.
See UNSC, Resolution 1966 （2010）, Adopted by the Security Council at its 6463rd meeting,on22 December 2010, S/RES/1966 （2010）；see UNSC, 6463rd meeting, 22 December 2010, S/PV.6463.
See UNSC, Letter dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 10 August 2000, S/2000/786; see UNSC, Resolution 1315 （2000），Adopted by the Security Council at its 4186th meeting, on 14 August 2000, S/RES/1315 （2000）；see UNSC, 4186th meeting, 14 August 2000, S/PV. 4186; see Micaela Frulli,“The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Some Preliminary Comments”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2000, p. 857.
See UNSC, Letter dated 13 December 2005 from the Charge d'affaires a. i. of the Permanent `Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary -General, 13 December 2005, S/2005/783; see UNSC, Resolution 1664 （2006）, Adopted by the Security Council at its 5401st meeting, on 29 March 2006, S/RES/1664 （2006）；see UNSC, 5401st meeting, 29 March 2006, S/PV. 5401; see UNSC, Resolution 1757 （2007），Adopted by the Security Council at its 5685th meeting, on 30 May 2007,S/RES/1757 （2007）．
See UNSC, 5685th meeting, 30 May 2007, S/PV. 5685, 4-5. China abstained along with Indonesia, Qatar, Russian Federation, and South Africa.
See UNGA, 57/228. Khmer Rouge trials, A/RES/57/228, 27 February 2003; see UNGA and UNSC, Identical letters dated 23 June 1997 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council, A/51/930, S/1997/488, 24 June 1997.
See UNGA,57/228. Khmer Rouge trials, A/RES/57/228 B,22 May 2003; see UNGA, Fifty-seventh session, 85th plenary meeting, 13 May 2003, A/57/PV. 85.
See UNSC, Resolution 1272（1999），Adopted by the Security Council at its 4057th meeting,on 25 October 1999, S/RES/1272（1999）；see UNTAET, Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, UNTAET/REG/2000/15, 6 June 2000.
See UNSC, 4057th Meeting, 25 October 1999, S/PV. 4057, 13.
See UNSC, Resolution 1976 （2011）, Adopted by the Security Council at its 6512th meeting,on 11 April 2011, S/RES/1976 （2011）, 5-6; see UNSC, 6512th meeting, 1 1 April 2011, S/PV. 6512.
See UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on the Modalities for the Establishment of Specialized Somali Anti-piracy Courts, 15 June 2011, S/2011/360.
See UNSC, 6512th meeting, supra note 94, at 15-16.
See Sarah M. H. Nouwen,“‘Hybrid Courts': The Hybrid Category of a New Type of International Crimes Courts”, Utrecht L. Rev.，Vol. 2, 2006, p. 190; Laura A. Dickinson, “The Promise of Hybrid Courts”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 2, 2003, p. 295; Harry Hobbs,“Hybrid Tribunals and the Composition of the Court: In Search of Sociological Legitimacy”, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2016, p. 482.
See Sarah Williams, “The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers: A Dangerous Precedent for International Justice”, The International and Comparative Law, Vol. 53, No. 1，2001, p. 227, 229.（Regarding the situation in Cambodia, China would not oppose an international tribunal if requested by the Cambodian government, but would veto it if it is imposed on Cambodia.）
See UNSC, 6512th meeting, supra note 94, at 15-16.
China was a member of both the Drafting Committee and Credentials Committee. See UN,United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June-17 July 1998, Official Records, Volume I, II, III. A/CONF. 183/13.
See UN, ibid.，Volume II, at 75.
See UN, ibid.，Volume II, at 123-124
See UNSC, Resolution 1593 [2005），Adopted by the Security Council at its 5158th meeting, on 31 March 2005, S/RES/1593.
See UNSC, Resolution 1970 （2011），Adopted by the Security Council at its 6491st meeting, on 26 February 2011, S/RES/1970 （2011）．
See UNSC, 5158th meeting, 31 March 2005, S/PV. 5158, 5.
See UNSC, 7180th meeting, 22 May 2014, S/PV. 7180, 4.
See UNSC, 7180th meeting, 22 May 2014, S/PV. 7180, 13-14.
See, e. g.，Pan Zhongqi, Conceptual Gaps, In China-Eu Relations: Global Governance Human Rights and Strategic Partnerships, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 58, 220.
See, e. g.，Kristen Hessler, “State Sovereignty as an Obstacle to International Criminal Law”,in Larry May and Zachary Hoskins, eds.，International Criminal Law and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 47; Antonio Cassese, et al.，Cassese's International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 142.
See Wang Yizhou, “Introduction”, in Wang Yizhou, ed.，Transformation of Foreign Affairs and International Relations in China, 1978-2008, Brill, 2011, p. 19.
See, e. g.，David Kennedy, “The Mystery of Global Governance”, in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman, ed.，Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 37; Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” and the Entry of Non-European Countries into International Society: The Case of China, Japan, and Siam.
See Tom J. Farer, “Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law”, American Journal of International Law, Vol.79, No. 2, 1985, p.405; see Anghie, supra note 9, at 320.
See Martti Koskenniemi, ”The Politics of International Law—20 Years Later”, 20 European Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2009, p. 7.
The inequality and injustice in the international political and economic life are the creatures of international law; see David Kennedy, “Law and the Political Economy of the World”, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, No. 1，2013, p.7.
See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, 1997, pp. 24-29.
See Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 33,1993, p. 22; see Edward W. Said, “The Clash of Ignorance”, The Nation, Vol. 22, No. 10, 2001, p. 1; seeKarim H. Karim and Mahmoud Eid, “Clash of Ignorance”, Global Media Journal—Canadian Edition,Vol. 5, No. 1，2012,p.7.
See Urs Matthias Zachmann, “Does Europe Include Japan? European Normativity in Japanese Attitudes towards International Law, 1854-1945”, Rechtsgeschichte-Legal History, Vol. 22, 2014, p. 228.
See Schwartz, supra note 71, at 276.
See Kai Raustiala, “Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law”, UC Davis L. Rev.，Vol. 40, 2007, pp. 1021, 1026.
See Nico Krisch, “International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2005, p. 369.
See Gerald Chan, et al.，“China Engages Global Governance: A New World Order in TheMaking?”, Routledge, 2011；see Li Mingjfang eds.，China Joins Global Governance: Cooperation and Contentions, Rowman＆Littlefield, 2012, p. 15.
See Shintaro Hamanaka, “TPP versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting”,Journal of East Asian Economic Integration, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2014, p. 163; see Stephen M. Young, “US-China Relations: Balancing Cooperation and Competition in the Most Important Bilateral Relationship in Both the Region and the World”, American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2015, p. 166; see Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on the‘One Belt, One Road' Initiative”, China Leadership Monitor, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2015,p．3.
See, e. g.，Edmund S. K. Fung, The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity: Cultural and Political Thought in the Republican Era, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 27-60.
These Chinese sayings had been used in public speeches by President Xi Jinping in 2016 and former Premier Wen Jiabao in 2008. They are quoted from the Classic of Poetry（shijing） and the Grades of Poetry （shipin），which are two classic books on Chinese traditional poetry and songs.
For example, the so-called “one central task and two basic points”, which means focusing on economic development, adhering to the “Four Cardinal Principles” and “reform and opening-up” policy,has been established and reinforced for many times in the 13th, 15th and 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.
See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press,2006, p. 5.
See Sherston Baker and H. W. Halleck, Halleck's International Law, or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War, London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1893.
See Jia Bingbing, “A Synthesis of the Notion of Sovereignty and the Ideal of the Rule of Law: Reflections on the Contemporary Chinese Approach to International Law”, German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 53, 2010, p. 11.
See Wim Muller, “China: An Illiberal, Non-Western State in a Western-centric, Liberal Order?”, Baltic Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2016, p. 216.
To some extent, it means that China “expresses rhetorical support for the higher ideals of international law while acting conservatively and with a priority towards a narrowly defined set of interests, by consistently placing limits on the interpretation of norms and restraining any expansion of international institutional power in which it does not have a say”; see Muller, ibid; see Jochen von Bemstorff, “International Legal Scholarship as a Cooling Medium in International Law and Politics”,European Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2014, p. 989.